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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SHAWN HENLINE,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

:
)

SAM SMITH, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No. 14264

:
)

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Shawn Henline, appeals from a decision
of the Third Judicial District Court denying his release from
the Utah State Prison upon the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Shawn Henline filed an amended complaint and petition
seeking a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his commitment
to the Utah State Prison was invalid.

The matter came on for

hearing on September 4, 19 75, before the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson, Sr., who denied the petition.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant, Shawn Henline, seeks reversal of the
court below with the direction that he be released from the
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custody of the respondent upon a writ of habeas corpus or,
in the alternative, this matter be remanded with directions
to the District Court that the Appellant be resentenced
after a proper determination of the degree of the offense to
which the Appellant entered a guilty plea.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 9, 19 74, the Appellant entered a plea to
the offense of theft as defined by Section 76-6-412, Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended) before Marcellus K. Snow,
judge of the Third Judicial District Court in Case Number
25559,

On May 2, 19 74, judgment was rendered from the

Third District Court in Salt Lake County and sentence was
issued thereunder on the 3rd day of May, 19 74, committing
the Appellant to the Utah State Prison "for the indeterminate
term as provided by law for the crime of attempted theft
(third degree)".

On June 13, 1975, the Appellant filed a

complaint and petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in
the District Court on the basis that the restraint of the
Appellant was unlawful on the following bases:
a) No determination was ever made by the Court as
to the value of the property taken by the Appellant pursuant
to the requirements of Section 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended).
b)

The Court below erred in finding that Appellant

entered his guilty plea voluntarily and the Court abused its
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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discretion in failing to allow the petitioner to withdraw
his plea of guilty prior to sentencing.
The transcript of the arraignment on January 9, 19 74,
which was filed as a supplemental record on January 14,
1976, will be referred to as "T.A.".

The transcript of

the sentencing on May 2, 19 74, will be referred to as "T.S."
and the Sentence will be referred to as "S.".
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE
THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN AND THE
DEGREE OF THE OFFENSE PURSUANT TO THE
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 76-6-412, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED ( 1953 AS AMENDED).
Appellant contends the failure of the Court to make
a determination as to the value of the property taken on entry
of a plea of guilty to the offense of attempted theft renders
Appellant's plea and subsequent sentence invalid.

No deter-

mination was ever made by the Court as to the value of the
property allegedly taken by the Appellant contrary to the
requirements of Section 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated (19 53
as amended).
It is clear from the transcript of January 9, 19 74,
that your Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense
of attempted theft.

On page 5 of the transcript of January

9, 1974, at line 8 (Supplemental Record), a discussion ensued
between the Court and the County Attorney and the Appellant
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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regarding the charge to which the Appellant is entering a
plea:
*'-.'•'"

Therefore, what, then, is your plea
to the lesser, included offense of
theft of property from a person (Court)
MR. HYDE: Attempted theft of property.
THE COURT: Excuse me, attempted theft.
MR. HYDE:

He asked you.

THE COURT: What is your plea?
MR. HENLINE:

Guilty.

THE COURT: A plea of guilty may be entered.
The Court at no time in the proceedings inquired into or
determined the value of the property and was therefore unable
to determine the classification of the offense of theft
pursuant to the terms of Section 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended).

The Court, further, failed to determine

the degree of offense pursuant to Section 77-24-9, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended):

f

Where an information or indictment
charged an offense which is divided
into degrees without specifying degrees, if the defendant pleads guilty,
generally the Court shall, before
accepting a plea, examine witnesses
to determine the degree of the offense
of which the defendant is guilty.
Even though there is a discussion within the transcript

of January 9, 1974, regarding the entry of the Appellant's
plea, it is abundantly clear that the crime to which the
petitioner actually entered a plea of guilty was not "attempted
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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theft of property from a person" but was instead, attempted
theft (T.A. , page 5, line 8 and T.S.).

Attempted theft of

property may be classified as anything from a Class B misdemeanor to a third-degree felony depending solely upon the
value of the property taken.

The Court failed to determine

that value and therefore your Appellant is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison pursuant to an improper
sehtence.

This matter should be remanded back to the District

Court for imposition of a correct sentence after a proper
determination is made of the value of the property and the
degree of offense involved.

Belt v. Turner, 25 U.2d 230,

479 P.2d 791 (1971).
POINT II
THE GUILTY PLEA ENTERED BY THE APPELLANT
ON JANUARY 9, 1974, WAS COERCED; AND WAS
INVOLUNTARILY ENTERED BASED UPON FALSE
AND MISLEADING INFORMATION BEING GIVEN
TO THE APPELLANT. THE COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT
TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY.
During the arraignment and all prior proceedings up
and until the entry of the plea by the Appellant on January
9, 19 74, the Appellant steadfastly had asserted his innocence
to all the charges pending before the court (T.A., T.S.).
Prior to the arraignment on January 9, 19 74, the petitioner
was approached by Mr. Lynn Brown who had been appointed to
represent him with the proposal that if he entered a plea of
guilty to attempted theft on Criminal Case Number 25559, the
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

County Attorney's Office would reduce the charges pending to
attempted theft and dismiss another charge pending in a
different action*

Defense counsel did then tell the Appel-

lant how to answer certain questions which would be put to
him before the judge on January 9, 19 74, and on advice of
counsel, Appellant submitted the appropriate answers even
though he did not understand the nature of the proceedings and,
in fact, the answers were incorrect due to defense counsel's
representations.
The record amply demonstrates that the Appellant not
only misunderstood the nature of the proceedings of January
9, 19 74, but was coerced by undue influence to enter the
guilty plea against his will.

At the January 9th hearing,

upon questioning from his attorney, the Appellant's response
as to whether or not he wishes to withdraw his guilty plea
was:

"Yes, I will take it to trial".

(T.A., page 7, line 8).

The Court then interjected its opinion upon the Appellant
regarding the purported plea bargaining arrangement, stating:
"There is no difference.

The case is going to be dismissed".

(T.A., page 7, line 10). The Appellant was confused and
the entry of the guilty plea by him was contrary to the
truth and contrary to his actual wishes.

He was, in fact,

being induced to enter a plea in this action because of
exterior pressures from the County Attorney, his attorney,
and the Court.

It is illustrative of the confusion which
-6-
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was caused by the actions of the Court and the respective
attorneys at the Appellant's arraignment when, in fact, counsel
for the Appellant stated to him:

"It will be dismissed on

the sentencing on the other deal".

(T.A., page 7, line 20),

It is blatantly obvious that Mr. Henline did not understand
both the nature of the act which he was being urged to do
nor the explanations which were being given to him.

The

"it" and the "other deal" both referred to another pending
charge, number 2 6201, yet Mr. Henlinefs counsel told him he
would be sentenced under that pending charge but at the same
time that charge would be dismissed.
It is well established that the entry of a plea of
guilty is substantially more than an admission of doing
specified conduct.

It constitutes, in fact, a conviction to

the crime for which the plea was entered and ignorance or
incomprehension on the part of the defendant acts to deprive
the defendant of constitutionally protected rights.
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

Boykin

Mr. Henline was instructed

not to respond correctly to questions put to him by his
attorney pursuant to the requirements of Boykin, supra.
In the transcript of January 9, 19 74, pages 2-5, Mr. Brown
asks the Appellant questions relative to his plea.

The

script clearly reveals Mr. Henline was instructed to incorrectly answer certain questions put to him.
MR. BROWN: Has anyone made any promises
to you as to what the sentence would be
if you pled guilty to this charge?
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MR. HENLINE: No.
MR. BROWN: Has anyone made any threats
or in any way made promises to induce
you to plead guilty to this charge?
MR. HENLINE: No.
*

(T.A., page 4 ) .

It is conceded throughout the record in this matter

that, in fact, a plea bargaining arrangement had been arrived
at which did induce Mr. Henline to enter his plea.

However,

after the entry of the plea, Mr. Henline then discovered
the plea was to "attempted theft" as stated by Mr. Hyde and
the Court (T.A., page 5, line 8) but the sentencing was for
the offense of "attempted theft of property from a person",
a third degree felony.

It is indicative of the coercive

circumstances surrounding the entry of the Appellant's plea
that while he is entering a plea to one degree of an offense,
he is being sentenced on a more severe degree of that offense.
The mere fact that a defendant, against whom there
are multiple charges pending, pleads guilty to one of them
on a condition that the other be dropped does not, in and of
itself, compel a finding of coercion.

This Court in Strong

v. Turner, 22 U.2d 294, 452 P. 2d 323 (1969) , stated that the
record must justify a conclusion that a defendant's decision
to enter a guilty plea was not arrived at rationally.
is the case in this action.

Such

There is ample evidence in the

record that the Appellant did not understand or rationally
weigh the choices because of misleading and confusing information which was being given to him by those vested with the
-8-
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responsibility of protecting his interests as well as the
interests of society.
The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas,
according to the Court in Brady v. Un ited States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970), at page 755, is essentially that defined by Judge
Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in She!ton v.
United States, 246 F.2d 571 (1957), at page 115:
A plea of guilty as entered by one fully
aware of the direct consequences, including
natural value of any commitments made to
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, must stand unless induced by
threats (or promise to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation . . .
Appellant contends he was not aware of the direct
consequences of his guilty plea in that he was instructed
to answer questions presented to him before the court incorrectly; he was misled as to the degree of the offense
to which he was entering the plea; he was told that the
other charge which was supposed to be dismissed was the
charge on which he would be sentenced; and he was misled as
to when the other charge would be dismissed contrary to his
agreement and understanding with the County Attorney (T.A.,
page 6, line 20 to page 7, line 20). It is submitted that
the composite of these irregularities in the proceedings
at the time Mr. Henline entered a plea of guilty was severe
and had an effect of confusing the defendant and coercing
him, whether intentionally or unintentionally, into entering
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a plea against his will.
Pursuant to the terms of Section 77-24-3, Utah Code
Annotated (19 53 as amended), the Court is vested with the
discretion to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty.
In

State v. Plum, 14 U.2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963), this Court

prescribed that withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing
is within the sound discretion of the trial court. As this
Court stated in Plum, supra, one cannot attempt to withdraw
his plea merely because he disagrees with the sentence imposed
by the court.

But in this action, Mr. Henline moved to with-

draw his plea of guilty prior to the time of sentencing (T.S.,
pages 2,3). This was not a case of remorse because of the
severity of the sentence but, rather, an attempt by the
Appellant to rectify a plea entered under coercive circumstances which he did not understand.

At this point in time,

there can be no prejudice to the State and the totality of the
circumstances set forth in the record of the Appellant's
arraignment on January 9, 19 74, and his sentencing on May 2,
19 74, clearly reflect a concerted effort by the Court, the
County Attorney, and the attorney for the Appellant to override the will of the Appellant and induce him to enter a plea
of guilty.

The sum total effect of the misleading and con-

fusing information given to the defendant by all the parties
involved and the total lack of any prejudice to the State,
and the Appellant's attempt to rectify his misunderstanding
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by requesting the Court to allow him to withdraw his plea of
guilty, present sufficient facts to support Appellant's
claim that, unlike the issues before this court in State v.
Plumf 14 U.2d 124, 328 P.2d 671 (1963), the trial court
erred and abused its discretion in not allowing the Appellant
to withdraw his plea of guilty and proceed to trial.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the cases and statutes cited and the
circumstances

in this action, it is concluded that the Ap-

pellant should have been granted a writ of habeas corpus or,
in the alternative, that the Appellant should have been resentenced after a proper determination of the degree of the
offense to which he entered his plea was arrived at by the
Court.
Respectfully submitted,
/"')
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ROBERT FELTON
Attorney for Appellant
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